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 Abstract  
In recent years, auction mechanisms have been widely implemented in online platforms, leading to the 
advent of reverse auctions sites on which people can offer small- and medium-sized projects such as 
craft or information technology (IT) projects. These sites are especially interesting for freelancers who 
can bid for a particular project. The principal offering the project can make a decision based on the 
bid amount as well as on other information available about the freelancers. In this paper, we derive 
factors from transaction cost theory that explain the decision of a principal besides the bid amount. 
Based on an empirical analysis of bidding information extracted from Freelancer.com, we found that 
the bid amount has the highest effect on the decision of the principal followed by the number of re-
views the freelancer has already received and the number of already conducted transactions between 
a freelancer and a principal. We also found that principals prefer freelancers who live in the same 
cultural area. Furthermore our results indicate that a gold membership has no effect on the decision 
of the principal which is of interest especially for those freelancers who believe they are considered to 
be more reliable as a gold member. 
Keywords: reverse auction, transaction cost, reputation, freelancer. 
 
1 Introduction  
Historically, auctions have had a long tradition and can be dated back to 500 B.C. However, not until 
the rise of the World Wide Web were auctions adopted as a broad market mechanism. In particular the 
decreased transaction costs for carrying out auctions can be seen as the reason for this development 
(Bakos 1997). In online auctions it is no longer necessary for all participants to physically participate 
in the auction at the same time. With the abolishment of these restrictions auctions are no longer lim-
ited to a certain kind of products, e.g. paintings, but can now encompass all kinds of products and ser-
vices as can be observed in the various online auction platforms (e.g. eBay, Freelancer.com). 
The decrease in transaction costs for carrying out auctions has led to an increased problem of informa-
tion asymmetries which directly influence the probability of an adverse selection (Dewan and Hsu, 
2004). In online auctions it is easier to operate with a false identity or to refuse the delivery of the 
goods after receipt of payment. Thus the selection of an appropriate transaction partner in online auc-
tions depends intensely on trust in the transaction partner (Sun, 2010; Bierhoff and Vornefeld, 2004). 
Trust is hereby mostly established by the reputation of the potential transaction partner. Several stud-
ies have shown that if a seller has a good reputation, they can achieve higher auction profits. In par-
ticular this correlation was analysed on the basis of a Vickrey auction (Houser and Wooders, 2006; 
Stern and Stafford, 2006). However, a transfer of these results to other auction modes seems feasible. 
In recent years reverse auctions have been increasingly used as an online auction mode. There the ini-
tiative emanates from the buyer (principal) and the seller (agent, freelancer) who places the bid. 
Thereby the decision for a certain agent can either be based solely on the bid (e.g. Dubli.com) or can 
be decided freely by the agent (e.g. my-hammer.com, eLance.com, Freelancer.com). Particularly in the 
latter it can be assumed that it is important for the agent to know, which factors the principal takes into 
consideration in awarding the bid. The principals want to reduce their costs as much as possible. A 
part of these costs are the transaction costs, so the principals have an intention to reduce transaction 
costs for searching for an appropriate transaction partner. Specifically in online auctions transaction 
partners are anonymous which provides an avenue for unfair behaviour especially of the agents (Carter 
and Stevens 2007). The possibility of unfair behaviour increases transaction costs of online reverse 
auctions. The reputation of agents helps to reduce transaction costs of a principal due to its ability to 
provide an insight into the agents’ behaviour. Other variables influencing transactions costs of a prin-
cipal especially in online reverse auctions have been sparsely researched. The theory of transactions 
costs has been applied in order to explain the bids of Dutch flower auctions (Koppius and van Heck, 
2002) and the market efficiency in double auctions (Noussair et al., 1998) though. 
The goal of this study is, based on a theoretical derivation, to confirm empirically influencing factors 
on the acceptance of a bid in online reverse auctions. In doing so transaction cost theory is applied as a 
basis for the definition of the influencing factors. The empirical verification of the deduced influenc-
ing factors results from data, collected from the online auction platform Freelancer.com.  
Section 2 of the paper introduces transaction cost theory and the derived hypotheses. The empirical 
verification is carried out in section 3. In section 4 we discuss the implications of our results as well as 
the limitations of our study and give suggestions for further research.  
2 Influencing factors on the bids of reverse auctions  
Online reverse auctions constitute a special kind of transaction, which differs from other transactions 
in the information and, particularly, in the bargaining phase. Getting information about possible trans-
actions or transaction partners is simplified and does not require the physical presence of the auction 
parties at a certain place and a certain time. On the other hand, the Web facilitates the use of false in-
formation or the hiding of certain information by the transaction partners, particularly the agent.  
Based on the assumptions of transaction cost theory the principal especially has to deal with uncer-
tainty. On the one hand there is parametric uncertainty, which describes the uncertainty about future 
environmental developments concerning the transaction. On the other hand there is behaviour-related 
uncertainty, based on the assumption of opportunistic behaviour of the market participants, which oc-
curs on the basis of information asymmetries (Williamson, 1985). This results in higher information 
and control costs. To reduce the behaviour-related uncertainty in reverse auctions, it is of vital impor-
tance to build trust between the principal and the agent. Trust is hereby defined as the judgement of 
the reliability of the agent and the resulting willingness of the principal to conduct transactions, despite 
the possibility of opportunistic behaviour by the agent (Wang and Benbasat, 2008). 
To reduce opportunistic behaviour and to build trust, nearly all big online auction platforms have in-
troduced reputation mechanisms. Principals (and sometimes also agents) can rate the performed trans-
actions and communicate their experiences with specific transaction partners. The reputation mecha-
nisms of the various online auction platforms differ only slightly. Mostly a three-point assessment 
scale is used: negative, neutral and positive. Furthermore principals can publish comments, which can 
be seen on the agent’s profile. Thus potential principals can judge the reliability of the agent and have 
a clue as to whether the agent is trustworthy (Ye et al., 2009; Dellarocas, 2005; Koppius et al., 2000). 
Kreps (1990) argues that on a one-time transaction with a specific principal, selfish and profit-
maximizing agents have an incentive to scam. This incentive is reduced through an appropriate reputa-
tion mechanism, because the agent has to fear the resulting negative consequences when dealing with 
other principals.  
Some empirical studies have analysed the influence of the agent’s reputation on the achieved auction 
price. EBay which is one of the biggest auction platforms was mostly employed as data source (Zhao 
and Huang, 2008). Results showed that reputation has a significant and positive influence on the prin-
cipal’s willingness to conduct a transaction with the agent. Furthermore, agents with negative com-
ments achieved lower prices for the products (Lucking-Reiley, Prasa and Reeves, 2007; Dewan and 
Hsu, 2004; Bolton et al., 2004; Melnik and Alm, 2002). Houser and Wooders (2006) showed that the 
agent’s reputation represents a significant and economic determinant of the selling price. A 10% in-
crease of positive ratings led to a 0.17% increase of achieved selling prices, whereas a 10% increase in 
neutral and negative comments led to a 0.24% decrease of achieved selling prices. 
In contrast, there are also studies where reputation has no strong influence on the transactions of the 
agents (Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003; Wan and Teo, 2001). In particular the negative effects of nega-
tive ratings on the agent’s outcome was not always confirmed (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003; Jin and 
Kato, 2008). Based on a meta-analysis Liu et al. (2007) concluded that reputation influences the 
agent’s outcome, positive ratings lead to significantly higher selling prices, whereas negative ratings 
lead to lower selling prices and neutral ratings have no significant influence on the selling price.  
In reverse auctions the bidders represent the agents and in the particular reverse auction online plat-
form the principals can choose freely, with which agent they conduct the transaction. So the following 
hypothesis can be postulated:  
H1: The better the agent’s reputation, the better the agent’s possibility of winning the auction. 
Besides the implementation of reputation mechanisms other measures to reduce behaviour-related un-
certainty are also possible. In particular this includes singular or regular paid fees to use certain func-
tions of the online auction platform. Such fees represent costs for the agent and only pay off, if the 
profits from the auctions exceed the fee. As a result the agent has an incentive, to conform to the prin-
cipal’s expectations in order to achieve the profits. If every agent has to pay the same fee, the behav-
iour-related uncertainty is reduced equally. If fees apply only by choice or for certain functions, it can 
be argued, that the agent with the willingness to pay those fees, has a higher level of trust, based on the 
behavioural assumptions underlying the expenses of the fee. So this signalling measure (Kirmani and 
Rao, 2000) may lead to a higher willingness of the principal to conduct a transaction with the agent. 
Hence the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
H2: Bidders, who invest by choice in special services, have a higher possibility of winning an auction. 
Besides uncertainty, specificity is another reason for increasing costs according to transaction cost 
theory. Based on the deliberation that during a transaction, transaction-specific investments by one 
transaction partner are done, one-sided dependences can occur. This can lead to opportunistic behav-
iour by the other transaction party (Hill, 1990). The specificity of online auction transactions is mostly 
low, because the goods already exist and only an exchange of goods and money takes place. In par-
ticular reverse auctions are used to auction off services, whereby the provision of a service can bear a 
high level of specificity. If transactions, based on a higher level of trust, are repeatedly carried out be-
tween the same transaction partners, a higher level of specificity can occur, even in auctions with a 
usual low level of specificity (Williamson, 1985). Specificity affects transaction costs depending on 
the frequency of the transactions. The more frequently the same transaction occurs, the lower the 
transaction costs are, based on learning processes regarding the execution of the transaction. Such 
learning processes can also appear if transactions proceed between the same transaction parties (Bea 
and Göbel, 2002). So the following hypothesis can be derived: 
H3: The more frequently one bidder was chosen by principal X, the higher their possibility of winning 
an auction of X. 
According to transaction cost theory there are further transaction influencing factors. These are sum-
marized under the term transaction atmosphere and include, in particular, political, social and legal 
framework conditions (Williamson, 1975). Cultural and linguistic differences between the agent and 
principal are among the cultural factors (Chen et al. 2002). Linguistic and cultural resemblance eases 
the communication between both transaction parties and thus leads to reduced transaction costs. This 
coherence is specified in the following hypothesis: 
H4: The more similar, regarding linguistic and cultural aspects, agent and principal X are, the higher 
their possibility of winning an auction of X.  
In addition to the transaction costs, production costs also influence the choice of the transaction part-
ner. The costs, which arise from the transformation of the service, form the production costs. At vari-
ous auction forms, the choice of the bidders is only limited to the production costs, represented by the 
bid level. At the here observed reverse auctions with free choice of agent, production costs constitute a 
further influencing factor, besides the transaction costs. At reverse auctions the principal chooses the 
agent, so the selection will be done by minimizing the costs for the principal. With regard to the trans-
action costs, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
H5: The lower the production cost of a bidder, the higher their possibility of winning an auction. 
Some of the derived influencing factors have already been analysed in several studies, especially the 
influence of reputation, whereas the influence of the transaction atmosphere is unknown so far. Table 
1 summarizes the studies and the investigated influencing factors. 
 
Dependent variable Study 
Auction price 
Dewan and Hsu, 2004; Melnik and Alm, 2002; Gilkeson and Reynolds, 
2003; Lui et al., 2007; Zhang, 2006; Standifird, 2001; Wan and Teo, 2001; 
Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2010; Easley et al. 2010 
Price premium Gregg and Walczak, 2008; Stern and Stafford, 2006; Hou 2007 
Willingness to transact Gregg and Walczak, 2008 
Number of bidders Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2010 
Relationship with principal Jap, 2007 
Independent variable  
Rise of ratings by one Melnik and Alm, 2002; Standifird, 2001 
Rise of positive ratings by one Liu et al., 2007; Standifird, 2001; Hou, 2007 
Rise of neutral ratings by one Hou, 2007 
Rise of negative ratings by one Melnik and Alm, 2002; Liu et al. 2007; Standifird, 2001; Hou, 2007 
Positive ratings Dewan and Hsu, 2004; Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003; Zhang, 2006; Wan 
and Teo, 2001; Easley et al. 2010 
Negative ratings 
Dewan and Hsu, 2004; Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003; Zhang, 2006; Wan 
and Teo, 2001; Easley et al. 2010 
E-Image Gregg and Walczak, 2008 
Auction duration Haruvy and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2010 
Control variables  
Number of bidders 
Stern and Stafford, 2006; Standifird, 2001; Wan and Teo, 2001; Jap, 2007; 
Easley et al. 2010 
Number of bids 
Stern and Stafford, 2006; Dewan and Hsu, 2004; Chen et al., 2002; Liu et al. 
, 2007 
Insurance Melnik and Alm, 2002; Hou, 2007 
Auction length 
Melnik and Alm, 2002; Liu et al., 2007; Zhang, 2006; Hou, 2007, Wan and 
Teo, 2001 
Starting price 
Stern and Stafford, 2006; Gilkson and Reynolds, 2003; Liu et al., 2007; 
Zhang, 2006; Wan and Teo, 2001 
Reserved price Liu et al.,2007; Dewan and Hsu, 2004; Zhang, 2006 
Price visibility Jap, 2007 
Picture 
Stern and Stafford, 2006; Melnik and Alm, 2002; Liu et al., 2007; Easley et 
al. 2010 
Product type (new/used) Gregg and Walczak, 2008 
Weekend Wan and Teo, 2001 
Shipping 
Melnik and Alm, 2002; Gilkeson and Reynolds, 2003; Liu et al. 2007; Stan-
difird, 2001 
Table 1. Variables in previous studies 
According to Table 1, the dependent variables in previous studies were mostly limited to the auction 
price and the realized price premium, which is also reflected in the auction price. As independent vari-
ables on the auction price, previous studies focused on ratings. Both the influence of positive or nega-
tive ratings and the influence of an increase of positive, negative or neutral ratings were analysed. The 
number of bidders respectively the number of bids, the presence of (transportation) insurance, the 
length of the auction, the starting respectively the reserve price, the presence of pictures, the product 
type and shipping factors (shipping costs, shipping provider) were used as control variables. However, 
not all of the used control variables can be applied to our study. So for example provided pictures and 
shipping costs are irrelevant in the considered reverse auctions, where services are sold by auction. 
Regarding previous research, one can criticize that on the one hand, in most studies, only influences 
on the auction price were investigated and that on the other hand the analyses were mostly limited to 
eBay, whereby the results are restricted to Vickrey auctions and eBay. Only Jap (2007) has reported a 
study investigating factors influencing the result of online reverse auctions. Minimizing transaction 
costs was defined as core premise for principals, but the operationalization of transaction costs was 
mostly limited to the reduction of behaviour-related uncertainty through the use of reputation mecha-
nisms, insurance offerings or provided information. Recent studies, however, indicate that the auction 
result depends on multiple factors and reputation is one of the most important factors. 
3 Empirical Evaluation 
3.1 Data Collection 
In order to prove the hypotheses derived in the former section we collected data from 2,662 closed 
auctions from Freelancer.com, which is a web portal for the global outsourcing of small- and medium-
sized IT-projects (e.g. development of websites, administration of blogs and newsletters, development 
of software). More than 1.9 million users worldwide were registered in November 2010 and already 
more than 850,000 projects have been successfully auctioned and completed using Freelancer.com. 
Potential agents can apply for a listed project with a bid consisting of an amount in costs and an esti-
mated time to delivery. Both bid specifications influence the production costs either directly or indi-
rectly and hence the decision of the principal (H5). 
For selecting an agent, the principal has access to further information such as the reputation and gold 
membership of each agent. Reputation is expressed as the average current rating, number of posted 
ratings and the number of incomplete projects. These reputation values are appropriate for estimating 
the behaviour of an agent and to avoid moral hazard and shirking (H1). Another indicator allowing the 
pre-evaluation of the behaviour of an agent might be the gold membership. Each agent can become a 
gold member on Freelancer.com for a monthly fee of US$ 20. The gold membership is intended to 
signal a high degree of loyalty, because an agent who regularly invests money is willing to seriously 
bid for and complete projects (H2).  
The rating profile of an agent indicates how often the agent has already conducted a transaction with a 
particular principal. We thus can prove whether agents having already completed projects for a princi-
pal are preferred (H3). The country of origin of the principal and the agents is also apparent on their 
user profile. We operationalized cultural similarity while assigning countries with cultural spaces 
(H4). If principal and agent are from the same cultural area, we define them as culturally similar. 
There is no common division of the world into cultural areas, though. However, most of the classifica-
tions are very close to each other, some define, for example, Europe as a cultural area (Newig, 1995) 
while others see no cultural difference between Europe and Northern America (Huntington, 2002). In 
this paper we use the classification of Huntington which is shown in Table 2. 
 
Cultural Area Number of Principals Number of Agents 
Western 2031 6209 
Orthodox 53 1700 
Islamic 239 5139 
African 29 790 
Latin American 68 829 
Sinic 25 550 
Hindu 174 13976 
Japanese 6 19 
Other 37 2037 
Table 2. Cultural areas and the number of principals as well as agents originating in the areas 
Taking Table 2 into account, it is striking that approximately 76% of the principals are from Western 
countries while 61% of the agents are from Islamic or Hindu countries. We can thus manifest that 
Freelancer.com is an IS supporting to outsource small- and medium-sized IT-projects. 
All variables used in this study as well as their data-level and assignment to the hypotheses derived in 
the previous section are shown in Table 3. Cultural similarity is a dichotomous variable stating 
whether principal and agent are from the same cultural area. 
 
Variable Symbol Level Hypothesis 
Bid Amount X1 Metric H5 
Time to Delivery X2 Metric H5 
Avg. Rating X3 Metric in [0;10] H1 
Number of Reviews X4 Metric H1 
Number of Incomplete Projects X5 Metric H1 
Gold Member X6 Dichotomous H2 
Number of Joint Projects X7 Metric H3 
Cultural Similarity X8 Dichotomous H4 
Table 3. Variables used in this study 
All variables shown in Table 3 are independent variables. We used the dichotomous variable decision 
of the principal for agent a as the dependent variable. The number of agents that can apply for a listed 
project is not restricted. In order to analyse the effect of transaction costs on our dependent variable, 
only those projects for which the principal has made a decision were considered. Furthermore we dis-
regarded all projects having only one bid. We collected data of about 20 days from Freelancer.com. 
This data consists of 2,662 projects and 31,249 bids, so that 11.74 bids were made on average for a 
project. The bid amount is US$ 218.83 on average (SD=US$ 3249.30) and a maximal US$ 500,000. 
However, only 11.66% of the bids were higher than US$ 250 while 29.26% were equal to the mini-
mum of US$ 30. We can therefore state that projects offered at Freelancer.com are typically small- 
and medium-sized. It is striking that the rating of those agents who have already been reviewed is 9.82 
(of 10) in average and that the standard deviation of this variable is only 0.38. We hence expect only a 
marginal effect of average rating on the decision of a principal. A summary of descriptive statistics 
about the independent variables is given in Table 4.  
 
Statistic Value 
Number of Auctions 2,662 
Number of Bids 31,249 
Average Number of Bids per Auction 11.74 
Average Bid Amount US$ 218.83  
Average Bid Range US$ 425.61  
Average Number of Reviews 45.73 
Average Rating 9.82  
Percentage of Winners with Gold Membership 51.65% 
Percentage of Losers with Gold Membership 34.88% 
Percentage of Winners from the same Cultural Area as the Principal 24.15% 
Percentage of Losers from the same Cultural Area as the Principal 20.18% 
Average Number of Joint Projects (Winners) 1.77 
Average Number of Joint Projects (Losers) 0.03 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics about the independent variables 
3.2 Data Analysis 
Since we want to analyse data from several auctions, we must normalize them such that the minimal as 
well as the maximal value for each independent variable is comparable over all auctions. We set the 
maximal value of each independent variable to 1 and the minimal value to 0. If, for example, the bid 
amount of an auction 1 is between US$ 30 and US$ 60 and that of an auction 2 is between US$ 100 
and US$ 250 it is not possible to analyse the effect of the bid amount when jointly analysing auction 1 
and 2. Such a joint analysis of all project auctions is, however, necessary because we only have one 
agent per auction for which our decision variable is 1 (winner of the auction).  
We defined datasets consisting of the winner and another agent randomly selected from all non-
winning bidders. These dataset were defined to compensate for the effect of a varying number of bids 
per auction. We generated a sample of 50,000 datasets using bootstrapping. Using only auctions with 
two bidders would be an alternative to our approach. However, this alternative is biased, since auc-
tions with more than two bidders are not in the sample. With our sampling approach we can assure 
that the influence of our independent variable is not moderated by the number of bidding agents. 






where Z represents the linear combination: 
Z=β0 + β 1X1 + β 2X2 + β 3X3 + β 4X4 + β 5X5 + β 6X6 + β 7X7 + β 8X8 
We further computed the variance inflation factors in order to quantify the severity of multicollinearity 
of the logistic regression. The results of these analyses are presented in the next session. 
3.3 Results 
The results of the logistic regression are shown in Table 5. A first surprising result is that gold mem-
bership and the number of aborted projects have no significant influence on the decision of a principal. 
All other variables are appropriate for explaining the decision. Table 6 presents the quality of the 





95 % Interval Std. 
Err. 
VIF Wald-z Sig. 
2.5 % 97.5 % 
Intercept -0.1715 0.8424 0.8123 0.8737 0.0186 - -9.23 < 0.001 
Bid Amount -1.0802 0.3395 0.3240 0.3558 0.0239 1.2203 -45.13 < 0.001 
Time to Delivery -0.4279 0.6519 0.6262 0.6786 0.0205 1.1642 -20.87 < 0.001 
Avg. Rating 0.0791 1.0823 1.0782 1.0865 0.0019 1.6775 40.70 < 0.001 
Number of Reviews 0.9483 2.5812 2.4715 2.6957 0.0222 1.5912 42.81 < 0.001 
Number of Incomplete 
Projects 
-0.0010 0.9990 0.9963 1.0017 0.0014 1.2330 -0.74 0.462 
Gold Member -0.0315 0.9690 0.9363 1.0029 0.0175 1.5576 -1.80 0.073 
Number of Joint Projects 0.6747 1.9634 1.8887 2.0410 0.0198 1.0262 34.12 < 0.001 
Cultural Similarity 0.4516 1.5709 1.5196 1.6238 0.0169 1.0288 26.71 < 0.001 
Table 5. Results of the logistic regression analysis 
 
Criterion Value Acceptance Level 
Likelihood Ratio 19227.89 - 
Degrees of Freedom 8 - 
Sig. Likelihood-Ratio-Test < 0.001 ≤ 0.05 
Nagelkerke’s R² 0.233 ≥ 0.20 
Kendall’s τ-α 0.243 ≥ 0.15 
Goodman-Kruskal γ 0.488 ≥ 0.10 
Brier Score 0.205 lower is better 
Akaike’s Information Criterion 119600 lower is better 
Table 6. Quality criteria of the logistic regression analysis 
All variables except gold membership and number of incomplete projects either have a positive or a 
negative effect, because there is no 95% interval starting on a level lower than 1 and ending up on a 
level greater than 1. The direction of the effect of the variables gold member and number of incom-
plete projects is thus not clear. Since these variables have been already identified as not significant, we 
have to declare them as inappropriate to explain the principals’ decisions. A negative influence of the 
bid amount and project duration, and a positive influence of the average ranking, the number of re-
views, the number of joint projects and the cultural similarity are detected with a confidence interval 
of 95%. There is no evidence for multicollinearity in our model due to very low variance inflation fac-
tors (VIF≤5) and moderate low correlations between the variables as shown in Table 7. Table 8 sum-
marizes the results with respect to the derived hypotheses. 
Bid amount is the most discriminating variable followed by the number of reviews, the number of 
joint projects, cultural similarity, and the project duration. Average rating significantly explains the 
decision of a principal but with a little explanation power only. We also estimated the same regression 
for those 311 projects having only bids higher than US$ 249 and found that the number of reviews is 
most discriminating for this type of projects, followed by bid amount and cultural similarity.  
Variable X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 
Bid Amount (X1) - 0.3871 -0.0337 0.1477 -0.0131 0.0448 0.0392 0.0158 
Time to Delivery (X2) 0.3871 - -0.0933 0.0344 -0.0417 -0.0438 -0.0197 -0.0114 
Avg. Rating (X3) -0.0337 -0.0933 - 0.5517 0.2811 0.5641 0.1140 -0.0748 
Number of Reviews (X4) 0.1477 0.0344 0.5517 - 0.3620 0.4528 0.2183 -0.0706 
Number of Incomplete 
Projects (X5) 
-0.0131 -0.0417 0.2811 0.3620 - 0.3689 0.0806 -0.1166 
Gold Member (X6) 0.0448 -0.0438 0.5641 0.4528 0.3689 - 0.1592 -0.0993 
Number of Joint Projects 
(X7) 
0.0392 -0.0197 0.1140 0.2183 0.0806 0.1592 - -0.0292 
Cultural Similarity (X8) 0.0158 -0.0144 -0.0748 -0.0706 -0.1166 -0.0993 -0.0292 - 
Table 7. Correlation matrix of the independent variables 
 




Number of Reviews 
Number of Incomplete Projects not supported 
H2 Gold Member not supported 
H3 Number of Joint Projects supported 




Time to Deliver 
Table 8. Summary of the results 
When removing the variables gold member and number of incomplete projects from our model, we 
got the same results for Nagelkerkes R², Kendall’s τ-α, Goodman-Kruskal’s γ and Brier Score and 
only a marginal lower likelihood ratio (19223.01). 
4 Discussion 
4.1 Implications for Research 
In this paper we developed and empirically tested a model for explaining why an agent has won a re-
verse auction in which the principal is free to make a decision independent from the bid amount. The 
model was developed upon the assumption that principals act as cost minimisers and want to minimize 
both production and transaction costs. This assumption also determines other studies. But in contrast 
to other studies, we first examined other factors than uncertainty influencing the decision of a princi-
pal. The model developed here thus represents an extension of existing work, but it also requires fur-
ther investigations to hedge our findings. 
The findings of this study have also shown that, if available, a principal considers many factors when 
making a decision about a transaction partner. Since other platforms like Elance.com or peopleper-
hour.com also provide information facilitating the evaluation of the loyalty of potential agents, it be-
comes possible to further examine the decision behaviour of principals. We thus hope our findings will 
not only be hedged, but also extended based on future studies. 
From a statistical point of view we made a suggestion in this paper on how to analyse models with a 
dichotomous dependent variable which is in most cases 0 and only in one case 1. The proposed nor-
malization and the bootstrapping approach allows many auctions to be subsumed and to avoid a bias 
based on different numbers of bids per auction and different maximal and minimal levels of our inde-
pendent variables. 
4.2 Implications for Practice 
Our findings allow implications to be deduced for both bidders and providers of similar auction plat-
forms. The most impressive implication for Freelancer.com and similar websites is that the revenue 
model they have implemented is not sustainable from a transaction cost perspective. Users of such a 
platform must pay a monthly fee in order to become a gold member. For Freelancer.com the most im-
portant benefit of the gold membership for a bidder is that “Gold members are often regarded as more 
reliable ...” (http://www.freelancer.com/faq/view.php). However, project creators do not honour such a 
membership in terms of a higher probability to be selected as auction winner. There is thus no need to 
become a gold member when the purpose for a bidder is to increase the bidder’s probability of win-
ning an auction. Although some other advantages are associated with a gold membership, our findings 
indicate that a very important advantage has no evidence. 
Furthermore the results allow a bidding strategy to be extracted that increases the probability of win-
ning an auction. New members have the problem that they have not been reviewed yet and that they 
have not conducted a transaction with any principal. They hence must compensate these drawbacks 
with a decreased bid amount and an earlier delivery date. In order to increase their probability of win-
ning the first project they should preferably bid for projects where the principal lives in the same cul-
tural space. Agents might be enticed to generate a shallow identity which is used to offer projects that 
the agent wins with her true identity. This strategy helps to increase the number of reviews and has to 
be prevented by the auction platform provider. 
Mature bidders can charge higher prices especially when they have already cooperated with the same 
principal and/or they have been reviewed by plenty of principals. We thus compared the bid amounts 
between those agents with the most reviews and those with the least reviews (per project) and found 
that there is a significant difference (p<0.001). Agents with a high number of reviews demand on av-
erage 17.0% more for the same project than those agents with a low number of reviews. Furthermore, 
agents with a high number of reviews have an estimated project duration which is 7.8% higher than 
the project duration of agents with a low number of reviews (p<0.001). Significant differences have 
been also identified when comparing the agent with the highest number of reviews to the average 
agent of a particular project. Agents with the highest number of reviews have a 3.1% higher bid 
amount (p<0.001) and 1.6% higher expected project duration (p=0.0366) than the average agents. 
These results are in line with those presented in section 2 of this paper. 
However, it is worth noting that the average rating of a bidder has only a marginal effect on the deci-
sion of the principals. It is therefore not possible to prevent unfair behaviour such as rest-on-the-
laurels. Although some information is available in order to make a satisfying agent selection none of 
this information can reliably assure that any agent is loyal and reliable. The problem of an adverse se-
lection could be, however, alleviated if the principal would also use the number of aborted projects in 
order to make a selection. 
4.3 Limitations and Further Research 
As indicated in section 3, all but one hypothesis could be supported. However, there is just space for 
improvements of the proposed model since the quality criteria are acceptable but not outstanding. This 
suggests that other factors may exist which also influence the decision of a principal. Since the bids 
are not binding, renegotiation and private communication might have a strong distorting effect on the 
auction result. We were not able to observe this data though.  
The investigation carried out in this paper assumes, at least implicitly, that principals are acting as ra-
tional deciders. From various source we know, however, that such decisions are sometimes neither 
rational nor rationally intended (Arkes and Ayton, 1999). Against this background, it seems conceiv-
able that the selection of an agent is not rational or rationally intended in all cases. 
As mentioned above cultural similarity is considered to be an influencing factor for transaction costs, 
but an operationalization of this construct is lacking. In this study we measured cultural similarity 
based on an assignment of the countries to cultural spaces. Although we believe that such a classifica-
tion of cultural spaces is superficial, the proposed operationalization can be viewed as a first idea. 
However, further work is required in order to better measure assumptions and prejudices a principal 
may have about a bidder based on the country the bidder is living in. 
Although the normalization of data was necessary to make independent variables comparable over all 
auctions, it prevented the effect of absolute variable levels to be measured. For example, assume a pro-
ject for which two bids exist. Bidder 1 has been reviewed only once while bidder 2 has never been 
reviewed. Furthermore assume a second project which also has two bidders, bidder 3 has 100 reviews 
while bidder 4 has 20 reviews. After normalizing this data, bidder 1 and 3 have the same review value 
(1) while bidder 2 and 4 have a review value of 0. This allows the relative effect to be extracted that a 
bidder with more reviews has a higher probability of winning an auction but it does not allow the ef-
fect of the absolute number of reviews to be analysed. In this example a principal might make no dif-
ference between 0 and only 1 review. Investigating the effect of the absolute number of reviews might 
provide an avenue for further research. 
Since our findings are based on an examination of only one auction platform, we plan to analyse an-
other online reverse auction platform in order to retest the proposed hypotheses. With the explosive 
growth of projects auctioned online, research on reverse auctions will have a far-reaching impact. 
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